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Abstract 
In light of the principle of additionality, the inflow of European Union (EU) 
funds should complement domestic public funds, which are required to 
cofinance the investment. EU funds should either be unrelated to fiscal 
decisions of recipient regions, and as such should not affect taxation 
choices, or they could imply an increase in taxation to finance the additional 
domestic funds required by the additionality principle. Empirical results 
linking fiscal autonomy of Italian regions, considered by looking at the 
number and the level of average tax rates for the regional surcharge on the 
personal income tax and committed EU funds, suggest the existence of a 
significant relationship, even after controlling for relevant economic and 
political factors. The level of average tax rates is lower the more EU funds 
are received, as is the complexity of the system, measured by the number of 
income tax brackets. 
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During the 2007 to 2013 programming period, €27,598 million were 
allocated to Italy in the context of funding for regional and cohesion policy,1 
a figure that represents approximately 24 percent of cumulated national 
gross domestic product (GDP) over the same period.2 These funds, the result 
of a complex multiactor game involving member states, regions, and the 
European Commission (Fenge and Wrede 2007), have been received at the 
regional level, and, as required by the ‘‘additionality’’ principle, should 
have been accompanied by cofinancing of the local recipients.3 The 
principle of additionality is at the basis of European regional policy and the 
allocation mechanism of Structural Funds (SF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF; 
henceforth European Union [EU] funds or European Funds [EFs]), whose 
purpose is to stimulate convergence and growth in the European Union by 
cofinancing regional public investment. Additionality in terms of 
expenditure measures the extent to which additional EU funds increase the 
total amount of regional public spending, instead of replacing it, thus 
ultimately leading to a greater positive impact on the real economies of the 
recipients (on the growth effect of EU funds, see, among others, Becker, 
Egger, and von Ehrlich 2010; Dall’Erba and LeGallo 2008; Pellegrini et al. 
2013). 
The focus of the present analysis is instead to explore whether the influx 
of EU funds is related to fiscal choices at the regional level, thus looking at 
the revenue side, once other relevant determinants have been accounted for 
and, indirectly, adding to the understanding of the additionality principle in 
practice.4 On the expenditure side, aside from the level effect driven by the 
compliance with the additionality principle, regional public investment and 
expenditures could be influenced, both in terms of sector and regional 
allocations (Del Bo and Sirtori, 2015). On the revenue side, if EU funds act 
at least in part as substitutes or complements to local public funds, regional 
taxation choices might also be modified. This latter aspect is analyzed in the 
present article. 
The object of the empirical analysis is thus the nature of the relationship 
between EU funds and regional taxation systems, in the context of fiscal 
autonomy in Italian regions, focusing explicitly on the revenue side.5 
Regional taxation systems are here defined in terms of the level of the 
average rate of the regional surcharge on the tax on personal income 
(Imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche [IRPEF]), over which regional 
authorities in Italy have fiscal autonomy, along with the number of income 
brackets in each region.6 Another taxation choice available to regional 
governments is related to the tax on production activities (Imposta 
 Regionale sulle Attivita` Produttive [IRAP]). However, this fiscal 
instrument, introduced with the 1997 reform, is more related to the industrial 
and business structure of the regions and traditionally linked to regional 
health expenditures. As such, the determinants of the regional IRAP rates 
might be different with respect to those of the personal income surcharges, 
also considering the mobility of the tax base of IRAP, suggesting the need 
for an ad hoc analysis, which is left for future research. If EFs are indeed 
related to the revenue side of the local fiscal system, a significant association 
should be found with all the aspects over which regional authorities enjoy 
autonomy, thus both the level of the tax rates and the complexity of the 
system, as summarized by the number of brackets.7 
Results of the empirical analysis suggest that there is a negative 
correlation between EFs committed to Italian regions and both the level of 
the average rates and the number of income brackets of the regional 
surcharge on the tax on personal income. This result suggests that the inflow 
of additional public funds, in this case EU funds, is related to the local tax 
system. Further, in the European context, this result might also be read in 
terms of the compliance with the additionality principle, and it might have 
implications for the design of the official verification mechanism currently 
in place. If the additionality principle is observed, local (regional) public 
funds should complement EU funds and one might expect that regional tax 
rates should be either unrelated or potentially higher, due to the cofinancing 
mechanism, after the receipt of supranational funds. The negative 
correlation between EFs and the Italian regional tax rates on income could 
thus be motivated by an incomplete compliance with the additionality 
principle. An alternative explanation for the negative correlation could be 
instead motivated by the impact of EU funds on growth. Lower tax rates 
could in fact arise, even if the additionality principle is respected and EU 
funds act as complements of domestic local funds, if the additional EU funds 
have a growth-enhancing effect and indirectly contribute to the increase of 
the tax base, thus allowing local decision makers to not raise tax rates over 
which they can exert control. While further research is needed to disentangle 
these two competing explanations of the reported negative relationship that 
emerges from the empirical analysis, the empirical results support the 
existence of a relationship between EFs and local tax systems for the Italian 
case. 
The results here may have wider relevance. The findings in fact relate in 
general to the literature exploring the link between tax rates at lower tiers of 
government in the presence of higher-level (national or supranational) 
 
 
funds, in the form of both committed and uncommitted grants, thus 
providing evidence on the interrelations with local tax systems both within 
and outside the EU. 
Previous Literature 
This article is related to previous literature examining the determinants of 
the local tax system and to contributions exploring the relationship of fiscal 
variables with additional intergovernmental and supranational funds. 
Starting from the determinants of tax structures and drivers of reforms of 
local tax systems, several papers have focused explicitly on the 
determination of income tax rate levels, one of the key expressions of fiscal 
autonomy of lower-level government tiers. The surveyed studies differ in 
the choice of the tax variable of interest, focusing, alternatively, on 
individual or business property tax rates, personal income tax rates, 
depending on both data availability and the structure of tax autonomy in the 
different countries on which the empirical analyses are carried out, but 
overall offer a set of consistent empirical results. 
Economic characteristics, including GDP, are found to be important 
covariates of tax rate levels, with more economically advanced regions or 
municipalities associated, ceteris paribus, with higher tax rates. The 
underlying mechanism at play may be labeled as a ‘‘base effect’’ (Kenny 
and Winer 2006), based on the relation between GDP per capita (or per 
worker) and the size of the potential tax base, implying a positive association 
between GDP and tax rates. Aidt and Jensen (2009) suggest another 
potential channel through which GDP per capita may influence tax rates, 
related to Wagner’s law. In this interpretation, the positive relationship 
between GDP and tax rates is motivated by the fact that larger economies 
will tend to spend more and thus also need more revenue from taxation. 
Winner (2005), while studying tax competition, also documents a positive 
relation between average effective tax rates on both labor and capital with 
GDP per capita in Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development countries, providing additional evidence of the positive 
association between rates and GDP. 
Another potential determinant of the level and structure of local tax rates 
is represented by grants or transfers from higher levels of government. In a 
political economy context, transfers and grants should be allocated 
according to the income elasticities of the median voter, therefore resulting 
in lower local taxes (Dahlberg et al. 2008). Recently, Delgado, Lago-Pen˜as, 
 and Mayor (2014) show that motor vehicle local tax rates in Spain are 
negatively associated with per capita grants, providing further support in 
favor of the median voter model. Potential increases in taxation, however, 
could arise if cofunding rules are in place. In a multilevel government 
context, Hulten and Schwab (1997) stress the role of tax competition among 
areas: if national (or higher-level government) funding must be cofinanced 
at the local level with own resources, a tax increase might become necessary 
to finance the investment, ultimately leading to a suboptimal level of 
investment at the local level. Lutz (2010) explicitly explores the relationship 
between voters and the local government and finds that additional public 
funds (in that case, New Hampshire’s school grants) have a crowding out 
effect, since governments spend only between 0 and 25 cents per each dollar 
received in the form of a grant on the targeted area. The rest of the grant is 
instead directed toward tax reductions. Revelli (2013) examines the role of 
grants from higher tiers of government on the local tax mix in the presence 
of binding limitations imposed to the lower tiers. Both theoretical and 
empirical results show that local expenditures respond to changes, both 
positive and negative, of grants and can be seen as supporting the existence 
of the so-called flypaper effect. 
Several contributions have framed the analysis of the determination of 
tax rates in a political economy context, viewing the existing tax structures 
as outcomes of a political process (Hotte and Winer 2001), thus leading to 
the empirical investigation of the association between political variables and 
levels of tax rates. Allers, De Haan, and Sterks (2001), analyzing the 
determinants of the local property tax rates in the Netherlands, explicitly 
consider political variables, namely, the local government’s ideology and 
the role of multiparty coalitions. With respect to the partisan variable, local 
governments with a left-wing majority tend to set higher tax rates, while 
large coalition governments set lower rates. Similar results are obtained by 
Sole´ Olle´ (2003) for a range of municipal taxes in Spain, including the 
property tax, the local motor vehicle tax, and the local business tax. The 
underlying mechanism at play is related to a median voter setting, where the 
local government sets the tax levels as a function of local needs for public 
services, the local tax base’s ideology, grants from higher levels of 
government, and disposable income. Delgado (2012) confirms the 
importance of political orientation of the local government by examining 
the local tax mix in Spanish municipalities, especially for the local property 
tax rate. Janeba (2014) provides additional insights on the existing 
 
 
relationship between fiscal decisions and ideology by reporting results from 
a survey of politicians and a classroom experiment. 
The existence of a political business cycle suggests instead that the local 
tax rates and the timing of reforms might be affected by the timing of 
elections. Support for this hypothesis is provided by Veiga and Veiga 
(2007), who analyze municipal tax levels in Portugal, and also by Ge´rard, 
Jayet, and Paty (2010), who focus on local tax rates in Belgium, finding that 
tax rates are lower in election years. 
Closely intertwined with the importance of political aspects on the 
determination of the level of local tax rates is the role of fiscal interaction.8 
A local government may set local tax rates’ level not only based on its own 
preferences and the characteristics of the local economy and electorate but 
also in response to what neighboring jurisdictions are doing. Fiscal 
interactions can be the result of public expenditure spillovers, fiscal 
competition according to the Tiebout model, based on residents’ mobility, 
or ‘‘yardstick competition.’’ Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) and 
Allers and Elhorst (2005) find support, respectively for Italian and Dutch 
local property tax rates, of yardstick competition, in the sense that local 
governments set tax rates knowing that the local electorate uses neighbor’s 
tax behavior to infer the quality of their representatives and entrants. 
Ge´rard, Jayet, and Paty (2010) analyze the local surcharge on the property 
and income taxes, finding evidence of yardstick competition only with 
respect to the latter, possibly suggesting the importance of mobility of the 
object of the tax base in determining strategic behaviors among different 
jurisdictions. Brett and Pinkse (2000), however, shed some doubts on the 
importance of yardstick competition as a source of the detected fiscal 
interaction among municipalities in their local tax setting behavior. Their 
results suggest that the spatial patterns in tax rates, after controlling for 
spatial heterogeneity, may not be linked to strategic behaviors of neighbors. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Baskaran (2014) who suggests that 
evidence in favor of tax mimicking may in fact be driven largely by model 
misspecification. 
Another aspect of the local tax systems that reflects the level of fiscal 
autonomy of the local government is the complexity of the system in terms 
of the number of income tax brackets. Hettich and Winer (1988) consider 
the rate structure as one of the elements of an overall tax system and suggest 
that, in a political economy setting, complexity in tax structures is politically 
rational. Building on the Hettich and Winer model, Fletcher and Murray 
(2008) examine a set of features of the progressivity of the state income tax 
 structure in the United States, suggesting the importance of political 
variables and selected state economic variables. Geys and Revelli (2011) 
document the greater importance of economic variables, with respect to 
political variables, in influencing the local tax mix, examined empirically 
with a panel of Belgian municipalities. Galli and Profeta (2009) provide 
both empirical and theoretical evidence from a probabilistic voting model 
framing the complexity issue as the result of the interplay between economic 
and political factors. While there appears to be a trend toward simplification 
of tax systems in developed economies related to the decrease in 
administrative costs of simpler systems, the heterogeneity of the population 
of voters pulls toward increased complexity. Their analysis, which accounts 
for the heterogeneity of voters, also suggests that leftoriented governments 
tend to favor increased complexity, as their electoral base generally tends to 
be advantaged by more nuanced personal income tax systems. Similarly, 
Ganghof (2006) documents that right-wing parties are more likely to reduce 
the complexity of the tax on income system, by simplifying and decreasing 
the number of income brackets, while leftoriented parties tend to be more 
keen on defending progressivity and, consequently, the number of brackets. 
Egger, Radulescu, and Rees (2014) further qualify this result by suggesting 
that political polarization, irrespective of the position in the political 
spectrum, induces decreases in complexity of a cross section of personal 
income tax rates around the world. Other relevant determinants of 
complexity suggested in the cited literature include local economic 
conditions such as GDP levels. 
Fiscal Autonomy in Italy 
After the 2001 Constitutional Reform and subsequent reforms (Bizioli and 
Sacchetto 2011) that paved the way for increased fiscal federalism, sources 
of revenues for Italian regions fall within the following three categories: 
own taxes and revenues, shares of national taxes, and resources from an 
equalization fund. Only the first category is under direct control of regional 
authorities, representing the degree of their fiscal autonomy. The most 
important regional taxes, in terms of contribution to total regional revenues, 
include the tax on productive activities (IRAP, Legislative Decree 15 
December 1997, No. 446) and the surcharge on personal income tax 
(IRPEF, Legislative Decree No. 446 of 15 December 1997). IRAP was 
originally introduced as a replacement of health contributions from the 
central government to finance regional health expenditures (Liberati 2002). 
 
 
As such, the evolution of this tax instrument is highly correlated with the 
dynamics of health expenditure and the related transfers from the national 
government. Regional revenues from own taxes (thus excluding transfers 
from the central government and revenues from other sources) represent 
around 30 percent of total regional revenues in 2010 (Italian National 
Institute for Statistics). Of these, approximately 26 percent come from the 
tax on productive activities, while 19 percent come from the surcharge on 
personal income tax. With respect to transfers from the central government, 
these accounted for approximately 11 percent of total revenues in 2009 
(Corte dei Conti 2012). In the remainder of this article, the focus is on 
taxation choices regarding the level of the rates and the number of brackets 
of the regional surcharge on personal income tax in order to explore the role 
played by the influx of EU funds. 
Empirical Model and Data 
The analysis of the relationship between regional taxation choices and EU 
funds is carried out by first focusing on the average rate levels and then on 
the complexity of the system, in terms of the number of income brackets, 
for the twenty-one Italian regions between 2002 and 2011. 
The link between EU funds and local taxation choices is analyzed by 
considering the amount of EU funds committed, and not paid, to each region 
per year.9 Committed funds should be the basis for the political decision 
making process at the regional level and should also allow overcoming the 
potential problems related to the timing of the actual disbursement, due for 
example to the decommitment rule of EU funds. Introduced in 1999, this 
rule requires that any committed funding to a project must be paid within 
two years of its commitment (Council of the EU 1999). This rule was further 
relaxed for selected countries and allows for a three-year window (Council 
of the EU 2006). 
Looking first at tax rates, data on the average rate imposed as the regional 
surcharge on personal income tax were computed for each region–year pair. 
As each region can set a flat rate or decide on the number of brackets, the 
average rate was chosen as the main dependent variable, computed by 
dividing revenues on the regional surcharge by the average income declared 
by the region’s citizens each year, thus approximating the effective tax rate. 
The idea is that regional authorities, when setting the rates, will also 
consider the expectations on the next year’s tax base and set the different 
 rates (if different income brackets are in place) taking into account the 
distribution of income. As a robustness check, the arithmetic average of the 
rates per income bracket (or the level of the flat rate adopted by the region 
if no brackets are considered) is used as a dependent variable. 
Based on the earlier literature survey, the average rate is a function of 
economic and political variables, along with the amount of EU funds 
received. In detail, the independent variables are GDP, the amount of 
committed EU funds (EFs), both divided by the region’s area,10 a political 
variable indicating the orientation of the majority party at the regional 
government, taking on value one if left wing (Left), and a dummy variable 
taking on value one if in the current year a regional election has taken place 
(Election). As additional controls, net contributions to the EU per capita at 
the national level (Net) are included, along with the amount of transfers from 
the central Italian government each region receives (Transf), divided by the 
region’s area.11 Detailed information on the sources of data is provided in 
Online Appendix 1, along with simple descriptive statistics of the main 
economic variables considered. 
Estimation is carried out by means of a panel fixed effect model, with 
robust standard errors, as specified in equation (1). All right-hand side 
variables, with the exception of Election, are lagged one period, since 
decisions on tax rates usually take some time to be implemented and the 
resulting rate at time t depends on its determinants at time t  1. This holds 
for all regressors with the exception of the election year dummy since the 
timing of elections is known ahead of time and thus: 
 
As a robustness check, this model, with the exclusion of net contributions 
to the EU per capita at the national level (Net), is estimated with spatial 
econometric methods, specifically by means of a spatial autoregressive 
(SAR) model. 
Also, when considering the complexity of the system, the dependent 
variable in equation (2) is a categorical value indicating the number of 
brackets chosen by each regional government, while the determinants are 
assumed to be the same as in equation (1), with the difference that an 
additional variable reflecting the lower tier of government, is added. The 
additional regressor is represented by the number of provinces within the 
region, divided by total regional area (Provinces) to account for the overall 
 
 
complexity of the local government structure. Estimation of equation (2) is 
carried out by means of a pooled ordered probit model, and, as a robustness 
check, by means of a random effects ordered probit (Frechette 2001). In both 
models, the limited dependent variable is assumed to be a function of a 
latent, unobserved, variable that depends linearly on the chosen regressors. 
The first model does not fully account for the panel dimension of the data 
while the second model exploits the panel dimension by including the 
random effects, and both error terms are assumed normally distributed. As 
previously noted, all independent variables, with the exception of the 
election year, are lagged one period. 
 
Data cover ten years (from 2002 through 2011) for all twenty-one Italian 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS2) regions. The 
sample therefore comprises 210 observations, which drop to 189 because 
independent variables are lagged one period in order to account for the 
timing of the decision process. Detailed data sources are discussed in Online 
Appendix 1. 
Empirical Results Average Rates 
Starting from the values of the average regional tax rates, results for the 
determinants of the average tax rate are shown in table 1. Regressors are 
added progressively, with results for the full model, as in equation (1), 
presented in columns 4 and 5, respectively, for the average rate and the mean 
of rates as dependent variables. 
First (column 1, table 1), only economic independent variables at the 
regional scale are considered, including GDP and the amount of committed 
EFs. Estimated coefficients are statistically significant and allow us to 
conclude that, on average, regions with higher GDP levels tend to choose 
higher average regional income tax rates. This result is in line with previous 
findings, which highlight how a greater tax base or a larger government, 
both characterized by higher GDP levels, are associated with higher tax 
rates. 
On the contrary, the higher the amount of EFs that have been committed 
to a region is negatively associated with the average regional income tax 
 rate, a result that can be read as suggesting a substitution of regional public 
funds by means of additional EU funds. The inflow of EFs may thus, at least 
in part, substitute local public finance and free up resources that can be used 
to lower the average tax rate, instead of complementing regional public 
investment, as advocated by the respect of the principle of additionality. 
 
Table 1. Average Rate’s Determinants. 
 
 
Note: The estimated model is panel individual fixed effects estimation. Robust standard 
errors are in italics. GDP ¼ gross domestic product; EF ¼ European Funds. *p < .1. **p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
This result is in line with a median voter argument, where additional funds 
are acting as uncommitted grants and are used to lower the local tax rates. 
Results related to both economic independent variables (GDP and 
committed EFs) are confirmed when adding additional regressors, although 
the value of the estimated coefficients decreases. 
Controlling for the aggregate net position of Italy as a contributor to EU 
budget (column 2, table 1) does not alter these results, while it suggests that 
the higher the contribution at the country level the higher is the average tax 
 
 
rate set at the regional level. This finding might be driven by a positive 
correlation between Italy’s position as a net contributor and committed 
funds at the Italian regional scale. More information on the underlying 
redistributive mechanisms of EU’s budget, however, would be required to 
delve deeper in this issue. Overall, the estimated coefficients for the two 
variables related to EFs and the EU budget are in line with theoretical 
predictions that suggest that, even if additionality does not affect local 
taxation in a direct way, there could be a positive indirect effect on the level 
of taxation though the redistributive properties of additional public funds. 
Moving on to political aspects, an electoral cycle variable also plays a 
role (column 3, table 1), with regions in an election year on average 
characterized by lower average tax rates, while a partisan variable, which 
accounts for the fact that regions are governed by left-orientated parties, is 
statistically insignificant. These results confirm previous findings that have 
examined the level of tax rates as the outcomes of a political process. 
Moreover, the total amount of transfers by the central Italian government, 
divided by the region’s area, is added to the model (column 4, table 1). The 
variable is not statistically significant, while all other results are confirmed. 
Finally, the average value of the rates for each bracket is considered as 
the dependent variable for the full model (column 5, table 1). Results in 
terms of sign and statistical significance are confirmed. 
To gauge the magnitude of the estimated effects of the economic 
variables, the results of the complete model (column 4, table 1) suggest the 
following figures by considering a 1 percent increase in each independent 
variable. A 1 percent increase in GDP leads to a 0.37 percent increase in the 
average tax rate, while an increase in committed SF is associated with a 0.32 
percent decrease and an increase in the country’s contributor position 
suggests a 0.13 percent increase in the average tax rate. 
To verify the robustness of the previous results to alternative explanations 
and models, the residuals from ordinary least square (OLS) regressions are 
checked for spatial correlation.13 In fact, a relevant body of literature has 
highlighted the presence of spatial mechanisms when considering local tax 
rates, suggesting the existence of yardstick competition effects, especially 
at the province and municipal level. While a wide array of spatial models 
are available, the prior is that, given the level of spatial disaggregation, the 
most relevant spatial interaction should occur in terms of the dependent 
variable (endogenous interactions) or in the residuals. Regional tax rates are 
likely influenced by those of neighboring regions or may be driven by a 
common, unknown, factor, while it seems less likely that they should be 
 influenced directly by the independent variables in other regions (exogenous 
interactions). Models implying the existence of global spillover effects (Le 
Sage and Pace 2009), such as the spatial Durbin model, seem more relevant 
in the case of finer spatial disaggregation, such as the municipal level, where 
the mobility of the tax base is more likely and the reciprocal influence 
between municipalities is more pronounced. This conjecture, however, has 
been formally verified by means of appropriate testing procedures, 
following a general to specific approach (Elhorst 2014). 
The presentation of OLS estimates before those based on spatial 
econometrics techniques allows to better highlight the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients, while also allowing a clearer picture of the 
differences in the estimated parameters, once spatial correlation is taken into 
account. An additional reason for showing results in this order is due to the 
nature of the analyzed processes and the level of spatial aggregation 
considered. In fact, spatial dependence may be more precisely captured at a 
finer spatial disaggregation (e.g., municipal level). 
The model in equation (1), with the exclusion of the country-level 
variable referring to Italy’s net contribution to the EU, is thus estimated by 
means of a panel SAR model with individual fixed effects,14 with results in 
table 2. Neighbors are defined by means of a distance-based row 
standardized weight matrix W.15 
Empirical results obtained in the a spatial setting are confirmed when 
considering the average rate as a dependent variable, with a positive and 
statically significant association between GDP and the level of the average 
tax rate. The negative association between EFs and the local tax rate is also 
confirmed, while the coefficients associated with the political variables lose 
significance. The spatial parameter r summarizing the endogenous spatial 
autocorrelation between the average rate in different regions is positive and 
statistically significant. It thus appears that average regional tax rates are 
correlated over space, with a coefficient for the spatial lag of 0.79 (column 
3, table 2) that indicates that an increase in tax rates in neighboring regions 
lead to a higher average regional income tax rate, ceteris paribus.16 The signs 
of the estimated coefficients are retained when considering the mean of the 
rates (column 4, table 2), although results are in general (with the exception 
of EFs) not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Spatial Estimation. 
 
 Average rate Mean of rates 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP (/area) 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.131** 0.095 
 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 
EF (/area) 0.095** 0.096** 0.097** 0.085* 
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Left  0.021 0.021 0.025 
  0.03 0.03 0.03 
Election year  0.015 0.015 0.016 
  0.02 0.02 0.03 
Transfers (/area)   0.004 0.027 
   0.04 0.04 
r 0.792*** 0.785*** 0.786*** 0.638*** 
 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 
Observations 189 189 189 189 
R2 Within 
0.42 0.43 0.42 0.18 
Between 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.004 
Overall 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.04 
Log likelihood 136.1169 136.7843 136.7923 95.3299 
Note: The estimated model is a spatial lag model with individual fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in italics. The weight matrix W is a row standardized inverse distance matrix. GDP 
¼ gross domestic product; EF ¼ European Funds. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
Table 3 shows a decomposition of the estimated parameters in column 3, 
table 2 into direct, indirect, and total effects (Le Sage and Pace 2009). These 
measures are capturing the cumulative effect in the Italian regions of 
 changes in the independent variables, which induce a change in the longrun 
steady state equilibrium (Del Bo and Florio 2012). 
Both direct and indirect effects are statistically significant, but only for 
the two main variables of interest (i.e., GDP and EU funds). Comparing the 
coefficients with those obtained by estimating the linear model (column 3, 
table 2), the magnitude and significance are comparable; the magnitude of 
indirect effects turns out instead to be larger with respect to the estimated 
direct effects. 
Complexity of the System 
Another facet of regional fiscal autonomy is related to the complexity of the 
tax system, captured by the number of income brackets that are used,17 and 
the existence of a relationship between complexity and incoming EFs is thus 
explored empirically. 
In our sample of Italian regions, the number of brackets ranges from zero 
(only one bracket) to three (the maximum number of brackets defined). The 
empirical model of equation (2) must therefore be estimated by means of a 
limited dependent variable model. The number of brackets is the observable 
manifestation of the latent variable, that is, the complexity of the tax 
structure. Given the fiscal autonomy granted to Italian regions, regional 
governments may choose the structure of the local income tax, an important 
aspect of which is the number of income brackets. First, a pooled ordered 
probit model is considered (table 4), for which marginal effects are 
computed (table 5), then a random effects ordered probit is estimated as a 
robustness check (table A1.4 in the Technical Online Appendix). 
  
 
 
Table 3. Scalar Summary Decomposition of Spatial Effects. 
Dependent variable 
 Average rate  
Direct effects Indirect effects Total effects
GDP (/area) 0.150** 0.463** 0.614** 
 0.06 2304 0.28 
EF (/area) 0.111** 0.338** 0.450** 
 0.04 0.15 0.04 
Left 0.026 0.081 0.107 
 0.03 0.10 0.13 
Election year 0.018 0.053 0.071 
 0.02 0.02 0.09 
Transfers (/area) 0.004 0.13 0.017 
 0.03 0.14 0.18 
Note: Estimates are based on column 3, table 2. Robust standard errors are in italics. The 
weight matrix W is a row standardized inverse distance matrix. GDP ¼ gross domestic product; 
EF ¼ European Funds. *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
The ordered probit estimation results are presented in table 4, where 
regressors are added a few at a time. With respect to the average tax rate 
analysis, some results are confirmed while interesting differences also 
emerge. Starting from economic performance, GDP is associated with a 
higher number of brackets, pointing toward a positive correlation between 
economic well-being and complexity of the tax system. Focusing on 
committed EFs, the relationship with the complexity of the regional income 
tax system is negative, suggesting that regions receiving more EU funds are 
more likely to have a less complex system. Once again, this result casts 
doubts on whether the principle of additionality is actually respected and 
suggests that the additional EU funds may free up regional funds and be 
associated with simplifications of the bracket structure or that more complex 
mechanisms are at play, which should be taken into account when 
evaluating the use and overall impact of EU funds. However, differently 
from the average rate-level analysis, Italy’s net position as a contributor to 
 the EU budget is not related to the complexity of the regional income tax 
structure, possibly suggesting a greater role for local political determinants 
as determinants of the structure of the tax system. This interpretation is 
corroborated by the statistical significance of the election year dummy. For 
regions in which an election is taking place, a simplification streak seems to 
occur in coincidence with election years, while the coefficient associated 
with the partisan variable is positive, suggesting that left-oriented regional 
governments tend to set a more complex system, although barely not 
statistically significant. Finally, the complexity of the region’s 
administrative structure, as documented by the number of provinces per 
head, is not statistically significant. 
  
 
 
Table 4. Complexity. 
Dependent variable: 
number of brackets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP (/area) 0.913*** 0.910*** 1.015*** 0.878* 0.832* 
 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.45 0.43 
EF (/area) 0.629*** 0.620*** 0.653*** 0.717** 0.751** 
 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.32 
Net contribution  0.173 0.222 0.236 0.197 
  0.28 0.31 0.30 0.31 
Left   0.537 0.528 0.539 
   0.33 0.33 0.34 
Election year   0.293** 0.308** 0.310** 
   0.14 0.13 0.14 
No. of provinces (/area)    0.258 0.203 
    0.62 0.67 
Transfers (/area)     0.096 
0.19 
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 
Pseudo R2 0.1790 0.1802 0.2004 0.2030 0.2046 
Wald w2 15.57*** 17.52*** 20.19*** 22.54*** 23.04***
Note: The estimated model is a pooled ordered probit estimation. Clustered standard errors 
are in italics. GDP ¼ gross domestic product; EF ¼ European Funds. *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < 
.01. 
Considering marginal effects of the regressors for which statistically 
significant coefficients are reported from the ordered probit estimation 
(table 5) suggests a further qualification.18 Interestingly, the signs of the 
statistically significant marginal effects in the first category, that is, 
corresponding to increasing the number of brackets from one to two, are 
quite different with respect to those estimated in the other categories. 
 Table 5. Complexity: Marginal Effects. 
Number of brackets (0–1) (1–2) (2–3) (3–4) 
GDP (/area) 0.259* 0.124 0.116* 0.020
EF (/area) 0.234** 0.112* 0.104* 0.018 
Net contribution 0.061 0.029 0.027 0.005
Left 0.158 0.078 0.069 0.011
Election year 0.091* 0.046* 0.039* 0.006 
No. of provinces (/area) 0.063 0.030 0.028 0.005
Transfers (/area) 0.030 0.014 0.013 0.002
Note: Marginal effects of statistically significant coefficients from a pooled ordered probit 
model are computed as the change in probability for the dependent variable associated with 
changing independent variables from ½ unit below to ½ unit above their mean value for each 
value of brackets. GDP ¼ gross domestic product; EF ¼ European Funds. *p < .1. **p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
An increase in committed EFs increases the chance of having two 
brackets instead of one by around 23 percent (column 1, table 5), while it 
decreases the probability of increasing the number of brackets, and thus the 
complexity of the system, in the other categories, suggesting that the 
potential relationship between SF and complexity depends on the existing 
structure in terms of brackets in each region. A related, but of different sign 
result is found when considering GDP. An increase in GDP is associated 
with a decreasing probability of moving to two brackets instead of one, 
while the sign is reversed from two brackets onward. The electoral cycle 
variable suggests that being in an election year decreases the chances of 
increasing the complexity of the system if there is only one bracket, while 
increasing the chances in the other categories. These results, taken together, 
might thus suggest that the determinants of the decision to move from a flat 
rate system to a slightly more complex one are substantially different from 
those related to incrementing the complexity of an already complex system, 
that is, increasing the number of income brackets when two or more are 
already in place. 
Conclusions 
European SF and the CF have been created to promote economic and social 
cohesion. Aside from the intended effect on economic growth and wellbeing 
 
 
of the target regions, however, EU funds may also have consequences in 
terms of local public financing decisions, both from the spending and 
financing side. In this article, the link that has been explored is the one 
arising from the association between EU funds and local taxation choices, 
in the context of fiscal autonomy of Italian regions. In detail, is the reception 
of additional funds related to changes in the levels and number of regional 
tax rates on income? The empirical analysis suggests that local finance 
decisions of Italian regions on both the number and level of tax rates are 
indeed related to the amounts of EU funds received at the regional level, 
while controlling for the relevant economic and political factors suggested 
in the literature. The higher the amount of received funds, the lower the level 
and number of personal income regional tax rates, after controlling for other 
relevant factors. While further research would be needed to better 
understand the mechanisms at play, the empirical results for the Italian case 
possibly suggest that EU funds are used as unconditional, and not matching, 
grants that may thus substitute local funds and be used to lower taxation. 
The first and most basic interpretation of this empirical result is that 
additional public funds, in this case from the supranational European level, 
are related to the structure of the local taxation system. Other studies have 
confirmed the existence of a relationship between intergovernmental 
transfers (or SF in the European context) and local public spending 
decisions. Taken together, these findings thus suggest that the receipt of 
additional public funds is related to both the expenditure and revenue side 
of the local fiscal system. 
Focusing explicitly on EFs, an additional interpretation of the results is 
related to the compliance with the additionality principle and the overall 
economic impact of these funds. The existence of a statistically significant 
association between the local tax structure and EU funds, in the context of 
fiscal autonomy, has, in fact, an important implication in terms of the 
evaluation and appraisal of the ability of EFs to achieve their intended 
objectives. While more data, with a longer time dimension and greater cross-
country variability, would be needed to attempt assessing the causal 
relationship between the two variables and its dynamics, the results point to 
the need of considering all aspects of local public finances when examining 
the impact of EFs. EFs are aimed at reducing the development disparities 
among the regions in the member states and, as such, require the cofinancing 
by the local regional public authorities. This requirement is summarized by 
the additionality principle, which states that ‘‘EU Structural Funds may not 
replace the national or equivalent expenditure by a Member State’’ (see 
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/how/additionali 
ty_en.htm). The additionality principle is verified, for regions covered by 
the Convergence objective, at the national level, and is based on 
examination of flows of local public expenditure. If, however, the 
association between EFs and the local public finance system is also reflected 
in the level and number of the tax rates over which there is regional fiscal 
autonomy, then additionality should be evaluated by considering the 
revenue side of the local fiscal system as well. 
Further, this result has potential implications also for the evaluation of 
the growth effect of EFs. The negative association found between the level 
of local tax rates on income and the receipt of EFs, in fact, has two possible 
explanations. On the one hand, the inflow of additional public funds may be 
used as substitutes for local public funds and, as such, lead to a reduction in 
the level of tax rates and complexity of the system. On the other hand, if EFs 
have a positive growth effect, the increase in local public funds required by 
the cofinancing mechanism may not require higher tax rates due to the 
positive growth effect. While further research would be needed to identify 
the actual mechanism in place, the empirical results suggest the need of 
considering the implications for the local taxation system, of the receipt of 
EFs, in order to correctly evaluate the compliance with the additionality 
principle and, ultimately, their impact on regional economic growth. A 
policy implication of these results is thus related to the current verification 
mechanism of the additionality principle for EFs. While an evaluation of the 
overall economic impact of EFs is beyond the scope of this article, the 
results suggest that the inflow of additional public funds from higher tiers 
of government, have complex implications for local public finances in 
general, including the levels and complexity of the taxation system. This 
suggests the design of proper verification mechanisms to ensure that the 
funds are put to their intended use and are not perceived as unconditional 
grants, thus fully respecting the additionality principle. 
The policy implications of the empirical results, however, go beyond the 
analysis of EU funds. In fact, the main finding that the inflow of funds from 
higher levels of government, in a multitier system, is related to fiscal choices 
of local constituencies suggests the need to analyze the complex 
interrelations between the different administrative levels. In the context of 
fiscal federalism, both within single countries and in federations of 
countries, the understanding of the interrelations of choices between 
different government tiers will aid in designing the most appropriate 
allocation mechanism and policies to achieve the intended goals. With 
 
 
respect to additional funds from higher levels, if the ultimate goal is to 
reduce disparities and promote economic well-being, as in the case of EFs, 
a clearer understanding of the intended and unintended implications in terms 
of local public finances can help devise allocation rules and verification 
mechanisms that can, in turn, help in achieving the ultimate policy goal. 
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Notes 
1. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/impact/evaluation/data_en.cfm. 
European Funds include the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), 
and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. All regions are eligible for 
ERDF and ESF, while CFs are targeted explicitly toward 
disadvantaged regions. 
2. This is based on gross domestic product (GDP) data from 
EUROSTAT. 
3. ERDF accounts for approximately 57 percent of the available 
European Union(EU) funds, while ESF and CF represent, respectively, 
21 percent and 20 percent. The allocation rules are slightly different 
for each fund and in the programming periods but are based on a 
 region’s (or country’s) economic performance relative to the EU 
average. 
4. Notwithstanding the important real effects of this program in EU 
regions, themagnitude of EU funds in absolute terms is relatively 
minor. For the period and sample considered in this article, EU funds 
range from 0.03 percent to a maximum of 2.01 percent of regional 
GDP. 
5. In a companion paper, Del Bo and Sirtori (2015), the additionality 
principle andthe relationship between EU funds and the expenditure 
side is explored. A further interesting issue, which is left for future 
research, is to examine the interplay between EU funds and local public 
finance from both the expenditure and revenue side, accounting for the 
full set of interactions. 
6. For a theoretical model of decentralization of the personal income tax 
at asubnational level in a welfare perspective, see Lo´pez-Laborda and 
Onrubia (2005). 
7. It would be interesting to have data on number of allowances, 
exemptions,deductions, and tax credits along with the number of tax 
brackets. Unfortunately, these data are not available for all regions and 
years in the analyzed sample in a coherent and unified framework from 
a single official data source. This motivates the choice made here of 
considering only one component of the complexity of the tax system 
in the empirical analyses, that is, the number of tax brackets. 
8. Empirical evidence on the importance of tax mimicking and 
competition amongneighboring jurisdictions is usually performed by 
means of spatial econometric techniques. 
9. Data were extracted from Directorate-General for Regional and Urban 
Policy’sDatawarehouse on December 12, 2012, and include annual 
committed sums to Italian regions for ERDF, ESF, European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Financial Instrument for 
Fisheries Guidance, and CF for the programming period 2000 to 2006 
and for ERDF, ESF, and CF for the 2007 to 2013 programming period. 
10. See Online Appendix 2 for a more extensive discussion of the choice 
of thescaling variable. 
 
 
11. In the absence of region-varying GDP deflators, all monetary variables 
in theseanalyses are used in nominal terms. However, the use of both 
the official Italy’s EUROSTAT consumer price index (CPI) as an 
additional explanatory variable, as well as using the CPI to deflate all 
monetary variables, confirms findings reported below. Price changes–
adjusted results are available upon request from the author. 12. All 
monetary variables are considered in logs. 
13. Additional robustness checks for this section are available in Online 
Appendix 3. 
14. First, a panel spatial Durbin model with individual fixed effects was 
estimatedand a set of tests were performed to evaluate whether this 
model was appropriate. Both the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) 
and linear tests suggested the use of the panel spatial autocorrelation 
model with individual fixed effects. This model was further rejected in 
favor of the spatial autoregressive model. Detailed results of the tests 
are available upon request. 
15. Several consistency checks in terms of the choice of the weight matrix 
havebeen performed. In particular, results turn out to be qualitatively 
similar with a Minkowski distance weight matrix of order 10, with a 
standard Euclidean distance truncated at three arcminutes (this 
implicitly assuming the extent of spatial spillovers becomes negligible 
outside Italian macro regions, i.e., North, Center, and South), and, 
finally, with a Euclidean distance weight matrix truncated at five 
distance coordinates above and below the main diagonal. This last 
matrix assumes clustering of spatial decays processes at a relatively 
local level. For an overview of the implications of the choice of the 
spatial weight matrix, see Corrado and Fingleton (2012). 
16. Usually, the literature on fiscal interactions is based on finer spatial 
scales, forexample, provinces, municipalities of other small 
administrative units, yielding lower estimates. The use of a broader 
disaggregation might explain the difference in the size of the parameter 
with respect to the results in table 2. I would like to thank an anonymous 
reviewer for raising this issue. 
17. The focus here is on the relationship between EU funds and taxation 
choices. Thus, a simplified definition of complexity, identified by the 
 number of tax brackets, is adopted. A more in-depth analysis of the 
relationship between EU funds and the more nuanced definition of 
complexity, including exemptions and deductions, is beyond the scope 
of this article and is left for future research. 
18. Marginal effects computed as the change in probability for dependent 
associated with changing independent variables from ½ unit below to ½ 
unit above their mean value for each value of brackets. 
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